Weekly Global Economic Update | Deloitte Insights
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What’s happening this week in economics? Deloitte’s team of economists examines news and trends from around the world.
Stronger US employment and heavy investment in artificial intelligence are supporting growth, while energy-driven inflation is increasing pressure on central banks. Deloitte’s economic update published November 10, 2026, covering the weeks of October 26, November 2 and November 9, also highlights weak household purchasing power, mounting concerns about technology-sector debt and renewed investment in nuclear energy.
US hiring strengthens, but wages trail prices
US employers added 165,000 jobs in October, substantially exceeding analysts’ expectations and delivering the year’s third-largest monthly increase. Unemployment declined, although stock prices and bond yields showed relatively little immediate reaction. Deloitte suggested investors may be paying more attention to inflation and the outlook for AI than to employment strength.
The government’s establishment survey showed that professional and business services, together with healthcare and social assistance, accounted for about 76% of new jobs.
- Professional and business services added 70,000 positions, an unusually large increase. That included 32,900 in professional, scientific and technical services, of which management consulting contributed 17,300.
- Administrative and support services added 24,400 jobs, while temporary employment services increased by 18,600.
- Healthcare and social assistance employment rose by 55,100.
- Manufacturing added 19,000 jobs, including 6,700 in computer and electronic products.
- Transportation and warehousing gained 24,800 positions, including 17,400 among couriers and messengers.
- Leisure and hospitality lost 13,000 jobs.
The data-center buildout may explain some of these gains. Manufacturing growth was concentrated in durable technology products, while professional-services firms have been working extensively with technology companies and businesses adopting new technologies. Durable-goods manufacturing employment has increased by 131,000 this year, reversing a decline in the preceding year.
Average hourly earnings rose 3.1% from a year earlier in October, compared with 3.2% in September and 3.1% in August. The October rate matched the slowest increase since May 2021. Hiring strength has therefore not produced faster wage growth, and pay has recently been rising more slowly than consumer prices.
That loss of purchasing power could eventually restrain consumption. Deloitte noted that consumers have so far supported spending partly by drawing down savings and borrowing.
The separate household survey showed the labor force expanding much faster than the working-age population. Labor-force participation reached 61.9%, though that remained relatively low compared with recent years. Employment, including self-employment, increased strongly, and unemployment fell from 4.2% in September to 4.1% in October.
Unemployment declined among teenagers and people with a high school diploma but no college degree, while increasing among college graduates. The overall rate has now stayed below 4.5% for a record 60 consecutive months.
Following the jobs report, futures-market pricing put the probability of a December Federal Reserve rate increase at 81.1%, up from 66.9% the previous day. That shift suggested stronger growth could generate additional inflation pressure. At the same time, the 10-year breakeven inflation rate—a bond-market measure of expected average inflation over the next decade—fell sharply during the week, potentially reflecting lower oil prices and changing expectations for AI investment.
US stocks recovered modestly late in the week after a substantial earlier decline. Deloitte said it was unclear whether the employment report contributed to the rebound, which could have reflected several factors, including profit-taking. Uncertainty about AI investment remained a possible explanation for broader equity volatility.
Quarterly compensation figures reinforced the pressure on workers’ real incomes. Private-sector wages and salaries increased 3.1% year over year in the third quarter of 2026, their smallest gain since the first quarter of 2021. Consumer prices, by comparison, were 3.7% higher in September than a year earlier.
Employers’ benefit expenses moved in the opposite direction. They rose 3.9% in the third quarter, the largest increase since the second quarter of 2023, with annual benefit-cost growth accelerating in each of the past four quarters.
Healthcare was the principal driver. Private-sector health-benefit costs increased 6.4%, following 6% growth in the preceding quarter. Separately, September consumer-price data showed hospital services costing 5.6% more than a year earlier.
The overall employment cost index, covering wages and benefits, increased 3.4% year over year in the third quarter—the largest gain since the second quarter of 2023. Thus, employers faced accelerating labor costs even as employees’ wage gains remained comparatively modest.
AI supports US output as financing concerns intensify
US real GDP expanded at a 3.4% annualized rate in the third quarter of 2026, its strongest performance since the third quarter of 2025. Technology investment and consumer spending provided much of the growth, although inventories also made a substantial contribution.
Inflation-adjusted consumption increased at a 3.8% rate, including 4.1% growth in services. Healthcare was the largest contributor to the services increase. Consumer spending supplied 2.5 percentage points of the economy’s 3.4% growth rate, despite declining real wages as inflation outpaced income gains.
Business investment was particularly strong:
- Nonresidential fixed investment increased at a 12.7% rate.
- Business-equipment spending rose 20.9%, contributing 1.16 percentage points to GDP growth.
- Information-technology equipment, including computers and related products, contributed 0.86 percentage points.
- Software spending added another 0.23 percentage points.
Together, IT equipment and software accounted for roughly one-third of the increase in real GDP.
Much of the equipment came from abroad. Real goods imports increased at a 26.4% annualized rate, subtracting 2.6 percentage points from GDP growth. The AI buildout has consequently benefited US trading partners, with strong exports from Japan, China, Taiwan and South Korea partly reflecting global or US demand for AI-related products.
Other areas were weaker. Residential investment declined at a 3.3% rate, state and local government spending fell 0.1%, and goods exports dropped 7.4%. Transportation-equipment investment also decreased.
Real nondefense federal spending rose 22.2%, largely because the government was winding down crude-oil sales from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Private-inventory accumulation contributed 1.6 percentage points to GDP growth. Without that inventory contribution, growth was 1.8%, most of which Deloitte attributed to AI investment.
Monthly household data suggested momentum was fading by quarter-end. In September, real disposable personal income—income after taxes and inflation—fell 0.3% from August, while real consumer spending was unchanged. In August, spending had risen sharply despite flat income.
The personal consumption expenditures deflator, the Fed’s preferred inflation gauge, increased 3.6% year over year in September, its highest reading since May. Excluding food and energy, core PCE inflation was 3.1%, broadly similar to recent months. Underlying inflation therefore remained elevated without accelerating, while a 21.3% annual increase in energy prices weakened purchasing power.
Strong economic figures have coincided with growing market doubts about AI spending. In the week preceding the November 2 update, shares in one of the largest hyperscalers fell sharply, erasing half a trillion dollars in market value. The technology-heavy NASDAQ declined 1.4% in response. Technology-company bond yields increased, as did the cost of insurance against default.
Deloitte drew a comparison with the dot-com collapse. The NASDAQ peaked at 5,047 on March 10, 2000, before falling to 3,205 by May 26—a 36% decline in two and a half months. Yet US real GDP still expanded at a 7.5% annualized rate in the second quarter of 2000. That was the final quarter of strong growth for a period, and the technology-equity collapse eventually contributed to a modest recession.
The comparison illustrates how investment-driven growth can coexist with a market correction that later weakens the economy. Current investor concerns center on whether AI companies can generate enough revenue to service their debts.
Credit-default-swap trading provides another indication of those concerns. Average weekly trading in default protection for technology-company bonds increased from $2 billion in July to $9 billion in September, while the cost of that protection also rose.
AI-related technology debt issuance climbed from $101 billion in the first nine months of 2025 to $466 billion in the corresponding period of 2026. Issuance is expected to rise further in 2027, making a substantial increase in AI revenue important to borrowers’ ability to service their obligations.
This activity occurred alongside rising bond yields in the United States and Europe. The US 10-year Treasury yield reached 5.3% in early October before falling sharply to 5% on the day preceding the October 26-week report. Deloitte interpreted the decline as a possible move toward safer assets amid economic and market concerns, including technology-company debt.
The Bank for International Settlements, which serves central banks worldwide, warned that companies could commit too much capital to projects with uncertain returns. Disappointing AI revenues could cause financing to retreat abruptly, turning the investment surge into a prolonged downturn.
Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh of Columbia Business School estimated that current plans imply average annual AI capital expenditure equivalent to 3.6% of GDP from 2025 through 2032. That exceeds his estimates for earlier technology-investment booms: 1.1% of annual GDP for telecom and fiber during 1996–2003, and 2.24% for railways during 1870–1890.
Both earlier booms were interrupted by financial bubbles bursting after excessive investment, revenue shortfalls relative to capital spending and abrupt shifts in investor sentiment. The railway boom’s temporary collapse in 1873 produced a very deep recession.
Fed pauses as markets anticipate tightening and the dollar recovers
At the Federal Open Market Committee meeting covered in the November 2 update, policymakers voted 7–2 to leave the benchmark interest rate unchanged. Fed Governor Lisa Cook and Cleveland Federal Reserve Bank President Beth Hammack dissented.
Fed Chair Kevin Warsh said inflation had exceeded the central bank’s target for more than six years, making price stability the main focus of the meeting. He argued that gathering additional information would help policymakers determine how to return inflation to the 2% target in a timely manner.
The Fed’s mandate combines price stability with maximum employment. High unemployment can lead it to tolerate above-target inflation, but unemployment was historically low. Warsh described economic growth as strong, domestic spending as resilient, productivity gains as substantial and capital investment as robust. He also said job creation had kept pace with workforce growth and unemployment had changed little, despite uncertainty partly linked to geopolitical developments.
One reason for holding rates steady was the decline in market-based expectations of future inflation despite higher oil prices. Warsh suggested that could indicate monetary policy was having its intended effect. Cook, by contrast, argued that large-scale AI investment was already generating inflation pressure that might not fade quickly.
The FOMC has one remaining meeting this year, in December. At the time of the November 2-week report, futures indicated an 85.3% probability of a December increase, compared with 78.3% the previous day. Markets also assigned a 56% probability to at least three additional increases before the end of 2027. Those readings, separate from the later jobs-report pricing, reflected expectations that persistent or accelerating inflation would require further tightening.
Changing monetary-policy expectations have also been one possible support for the US dollar’s recovery in 2026. The currency had fallen sharply against major counterparts in 2025 after the introduction of historically high US tariffs. One explanation was that investors expected import restrictions and weaker international trade to reduce demand for dollars.
Deloitte identified several possible reasons for the subsequent rebound.
First, global investors have directed substantial capital into US equities, partly because of AI enthusiasm. Foreign holdings of US stocks have risen sharply, while foreign bond holdings have been steadier. Those inflows have supported AI-related share prices, potentially reinforcing investor enthusiasm. A reversal in an AI bubble, however, could weaken both equities and the dollar.
The Middle East conflict may also have encouraged investment in the United States. Its effects on Europe and Asia have been more severe, partly because the United States has greater flexibility in natural gas. Investors may have increased US exposure as parts of Europe and Asia faced sharply higher liquefied-natural-gas prices.
Second, higher oil prices can increase demand for dollars because oil has historically been traded in the US currency. Other conditions unchanged, falling oil prices could therefore weaken the dollar.
Third, economic and political difficulties elsewhere may have made US assets relatively attractive. France has faced political and social uncertainty; France, the United Kingdom and Japan have experienced higher bond yields amid fiscal concerns; and Canada and much of Western Europe have faced doubts about growth because of weak productivity gains.
The United States may appear comparatively safer because of stronger growth and relative political and social stability. Although its budget deficit is large, its role as issuer of the leading global currency helps counter concerns about fiscal management.
Fourth, investors began 2026 expecting US monetary easing but shifted toward anticipating tightening after the Middle East conflict lifted oil prices and inflation. The Fed has already raised its benchmark rate once this year, and expectations of further increases can support dollar demand.
Deloitte declined to offer a directional forecast for the currency, citing uncertainty over relative inflation, monetary-policy changes, the Middle East conflict, AI investment and political and social stability across countries.
Europe faces higher inflation, tighter policy and public unrest
Eurozone consumer inflation reached 4% in October, according to the European Commission, up from 1.9% in February immediately before the Middle East conflict began. The October reading was the highest since September 2023 and twice the European Central Bank’s 2% target. Prices increased 0.4% from September.
Energy remained the main source of pressure. Its prices rose 20.8% year over year and 1.4% month over month. Core inflation, excluding food and energy, was 2.5%, little changed from levels over the preceding six months. That suggested energy inflation had not yet caused a sustained acceleration in other goods and services.
Annual October inflation across the 20-member currency bloc varied considerably:
- Germany: 2.8%; France: 3.8%; Italy: 5.6%; Spain: 4.9%.
- Netherlands: 3.3%; Belgium: 5.2%; Greece: 5.6%.
- Austria: 3.5%; Portugal: 3.9%; Finland: 3.4%.
Futures markets assigned an 88% probability to a 25-basis-point ECB rate increase in December, compared with 82% a few days earlier. They also indicated a two-thirds likelihood of at least two increases by the end of April 2027.
A sustained decline in oil prices could alter both inflation and the policy outlook. Leadership could also affect expectations: ECB President Lagarde is due to leave her post soon, and a successor regarded as more dovish could influence anticipated policy and bond prices. Deloitte said the actual policy consequences of a leadership change remained uncertain.
In the United Kingdom, the Bank of England raised its benchmark rate by 25 basis points to 4%, its first increase since 2023 and the highest level since December 2025. All nine policy-committee members supported an increase, although Catherine Mann preferred a 50-basis-point move.
The bank expects consumer inflation to reach 5% in the second quarter of 2027 before falling, with a return to its 2% target by late 2028.
Governor Bailey cautioned that the decision did not necessarily begin a long series of increases, but also indicated that it was unlikely to be the last unless the Middle East conflict was resolved. Recent oil-price declines, driven by greater hopes of a settlement, did not automatically guarantee lower inflation.
A credible, lasting de-escalation could produce a durable fall in oil prices and inflation, Bailey said, while escalation could keep prices elevated. Policy would therefore depend on developments in the conflict. Further tightening could weaken credit-market activity and economic growth.
Economic pressures have also fed political tensions. The October 26-week update described major demonstrations in France, Italy, Belgium and Albania, some of which turned violent. French unrest affected Paris, Lille, Lyon, Marseille and Limoges.
According to news reports, the French protests began peacefully among students, teachers and parents concerned about inadequate education funding. As demonstrations widened, living costs and other economic issues became more prominent. Some political commentators suggested the unrest could affect the environment ahead of the following year’s presidential election.
September eurozone inflation had already reached 3.8%, its highest rate since September 2023. Energy prices were 18.8% higher than a year earlier—the largest increase since January 2023. At the time of the October update, European natural-gas prices were 184% above their pre-conflict level. Disrupted LNG supplies from the Persian Gulf were raising heating costs, particularly ahead of winter.
France’s 10-year government-bond yield reached 4.93% at that report’s writing, its highest level in nearly 20 years. Inflation, inflation expectations, anticipated monetary tightening and greater technology-company bond issuance were possible contributors to rising sovereign yields across countries.
France also faced concerns over whether its government had sufficient political resolve to address fiscal imbalances, alongside uncertainty about upcoming elections. Political leaders were consequently balancing bond investors’ demands against voters’ different priorities.
Despite high overall government spending, younger voters appeared concerned that older generations were benefiting disproportionately. Over three decades, the share of spending devoted to pensions and healthcare increased by 5.6 percentage points. The combined share for education, defense and public safety declined by 2 percentage points, while transportation’s share fell by 1.5 percentage points.
Such tensions extend beyond France and Europe. Aging populations, low birth rates and fewer workers relative to retirees are changing fiscal priorities. Older citizens’ historically higher turnout in many democracies can make reallocating expenditure across generations politically difficult, contributing to younger voters’ frustration.
China’s recovery depends heavily on technology exports
China’s economy accelerated modestly in the third quarter, supported by additional government stimulus to strengthen demand and ease credit conditions, spending ahead of Golden Week and, most importantly, AI-related exports.
Real GDP increased 4.5% from a year earlier. Although substantially faster than in the preceding quarter, it was still the second-slowest annual growth rate since the second quarter of 2022. Output rose 1.2% from the second quarter, a relatively strong result given those supports.
Weak domestic demand remained a major obstacle, particularly in fixed-asset investment and property. Strong exports also faced risks from foreign protectionism and a possible downturn in the global AI economy.
September retail sales increased 1.1% year over year, the strongest growth since February 2026. Communications-equipment sales rose 31.1%, but automobile sales fell 21.2%.
Fixed-asset investment declined 7.2% in the first nine months of 2026 compared with a year earlier, matching the decline recorded for the first eight months. It was among the weakest readings since April 2020, when COVID-19 disrupted the economy.
Property investment fell 20.6%, largely because of residential-market difficulties. New-home prices in the top 20 cities continued falling in September after declines during most of the preceding four years. Shanghai’s reported office-vacancy rate was also among the world’s highest for major cities, suggesting excess commercial space was restraining investment.
Excluding property, fixed-asset investment fell 4.2%. Manufacturing investment declined 2.1% and infrastructure investment 4.2%, although Deloitte considered AI-infrastructure spending likely to have remained strong.
Industrial production was more resilient, increasing 5.5% year over year in September, its best result since March 2026. Manufacturing output rose 6%.
Computers and communications equipment expanded 16.4%, railway and shipbuilding output increased 11.7%, and automotive production rose 6.7%. These gains supported exports rather than indicating broad domestic strength. In autos, for example, strong exports partly bridged the gap between increasing production and sharply declining retail sales.
China is also investing heavily in AI, though less than the United States. A Chinese think tank estimated China’s 2026 AI-related spending at US$220 billion, comprising $160 billion in capital expenditure and $60 billion in model training. Its estimate for US spending was $840 billion.
The report projected AI investment would contribute 1.3 percentage points to US economic growth this year, against 0.4 percentage points in China.
Deloitte cautioned that the comparison does not fully capture trade effects. A substantial portion of US investment pays for imported servers, chips and related equipment, helping explain strong US import growth. Deducting those imports would reduce AI investment’s contribution to US growth.
China, meanwhile, is a major exporter of AI-related goods, meaning its growth benefits arise from overseas demand as well as domestic investment.
Both economies consequently show signs of a K-shaped pattern: AI-related activity provides much of the growth while traditional domestic demand lags. Recent declines in AI-linked shares in both countries raise the possibility that a broader equity downturn could reduce investment.
Energy disruptions sustain price risks and revive nuclear investment
Oil-market conditions shifted across the reporting period. While the November updates discussed falling oil prices and greater hopes of a Middle East settlement, the October 26-week report recorded Brent crude at US$117 despite renewed shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.
Overall Middle Eastern oil exports had returned to levels seen before the conflict. Shipments through Hormuz remained about one-third below their pre-conflict level, but alternative routes offset much of that shortfall. Saudi Arabia was moving oil through the Red Sea, and pipelines were carrying some supplies to the Arabian Sea.
Several threats nevertheless kept prices elevated. Iran continued attacking tankers and oil-production and distribution infrastructure. Iran-aligned Houthi rebels in Yemen continued strikes on Saudi energy and nonenergy facilities. The United States and Israel had also indicated they might resume military strikes on Iran after the November 3, 2026, US midterm elections, limiting prospects for a rapid settlement.
Chinese crude imports were reportedly recovering toward pre-conflict levels. That could indicate a reduction in sales from China’s reserves, whose release had been viewed as an important stabilizing influence on oil prices. Because China does not publish reserve data, the scale of any change was uncertain.
Deloitte warned in the October report that continued threats to production and distribution, combined with substantially fewer Chinese reserve releases, could drive crude prices considerably higher. That would add to inflation expectations and anticipated central-bank tightening. At that point, it judged an acceleration in inflation more likely than a slowdown.
Refined-fuel prices had risen even faster than crude over the preceding year, partly because refining capacity was constrained. Iranian attacks damaged Middle Eastern refineries, while Ukrainian attacks had taken about one-third of Russian refining capacity offline. The resulting increases in jet fuel, diesel and heating-oil prices added to global inflation pressure.
US heating-oil prices reached a record, threatening the finances of low- and middle-income households in the Northeast. Home-heating expenses there could rise 50% in the coming winter. Elsewhere across the northern United States, natural gas and electricity are more commonly used for heating.
Energy-security concerns are also helping renew interest in nuclear power, alongside rising electricity demand from rapidly expanding data centers.
There are 79 nuclear reactors under construction worldwide, the highest total in 40 years. Nuclear investment fell sharply after the Chernobyl accident four decades ago, but activity is now increasing.
Including reactors expected to begin operating within 15 years brings the development total to 201. Allowing for some existing plants to close, the number of operating reactors could exceed 600 by 2041, compared with 443 currently.
AI demand is only one driver. Natural-gas supplies, important for electricity generation in Europe and Asia, have suffered two major disruptions this decade: after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and after the Middle East conflict began in 2026. Nuclear generation offers a way to reduce exposure to such interruptions and generally produces very low carbon emissions.
Of the 79 reactors being built, 38 are in China, eight in India and seven in Russia. Those countries account for most current construction. Western Europe, which had largely moved away from nuclear power apart from France, is also showing signs of changing attitudes and increasing investment.
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- Nov 10, 2026 · 3:58 PM UTC
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- deloitte.com
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- deloitte.com
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